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THE MAGISTRATE'S ROLE IN UNANNOUNCED
ENTRY
A police officer is normally required to knock and give notice
of his identity and purpose before entering a house to effect a search
or arrest.' In many jurisdictions, however, this announcement re-
quirement is excused when, immediately before entry, the officer has
reasonable cause to believe that compliance would permit the destruc-
tion of evidence, increase his peril, permit escape or be a useless ges-
ture since the officer's identity and purpose are known.2 As a recent
development, statutes3 and judicial decisions4 in a few jurisdictions
have authorized a magistrate to permit an officer to enter unannounced.
The magistrate can include a no-knock provision in ,the search or ar-
rest warrant (a "no-knock warrant") if facts justifying unannounced
entry are known at the time of the application for the search5 or ar-
rest' warrant. Thus, the officer's judgment is replaced by that of the
magistrate, and the time for making the determination of whether the
situation justifies unannounced entry is moved forward. Failure to
obtain a "no-knock warrant" when the opportunity is available should
invalidate the subsequent search or arrest if the entry is unannounced.7
1. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 46 (1963); 116 CONo. REc. 25425-26
App. (1970). For a history of the announcement rule see, Accarino v. United States,
179 F.2d 456, 460-64 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Un-
Lawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499,
499-508 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Blakey].
2. See 116 CONG. RFc. 25425-26 App. (1970); Note, No-Knock and the Consti-
tution: The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970
[A Critique and Proposed Alterations], 55 MiNN. L. REV. 871, 875-81 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as No-Knock and the Constitution]; Note, No-Knock Search and Seizure
and the District of Columbia Crime Act: A Constitutional Analysis, 62 J. CrMs. L. C.
& P.S. 350 (1971).
3. Controlled Substances Act § 509, 21 U.S.C. § 879 (1972); D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. ANN. § 23-591(c) (Supp. 1970); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-411 (Supp. 1972);
N.Y. CRiM. PRO. LAw § 690.35(3)(b) (McKinney 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-
08 (1974).
4. People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 559, 484 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1971); State v.
Parker, 283 Minn. 127, 136, 166 N.W.2d 347, 353 (1969).
5. All the statutes and judicial decisions cited in notes 3 & 4, supra, permit the
magistrate to authorize unannounced entry if facts justifying such entry are known at
the time the search warrant is obtained.
6. People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 559, 484 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1971); D.C.
CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 23-591(c) (Supp. 1970); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-411 (Supp.
1972).
7. See People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 559, 484 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1971); State
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Two recent California cases are at variance with this trend.
People v. Dumass upheld an unannounced entry when the facts sup-
porting the entry were not reviewed by the magistrate even though
they were known to the officer at the time the search warrant was
obtained." Parlsey v. Superior Court'° held that a magistrate had no
authority to issue a "no-knock warrant"; the officer must decide whether
umannounced entry is justified in view of all the facts known to him
immediately before entry.
The Parsley result is desirable to the extent that it holds that a
magistrate cannot absolutely authorize an officer to enter unannounced;
circumstances which justified the unannounced entry when the warrant
was obtained might change after the magistrate's decision and before
the entry. However, both Parsley and Dumas go beyond this result
v. Parker, 283 Minn. 127, 136, 166 N.W.2d 347, 353 (1969); State v. Brooks, 189 Neb.
592, 204 N.W.2d 86 (1973); State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1973); D.C.
CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 23-591 (Supp. 1970).
8. 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973). A confidential
informant reported to police officers that he had seen the defendant in posssession of
stolen property and narcotics and also had observed the defendant answer his door with
a loaded gun in his hand. On the basis of this information the officers obtained a
search warrant, entered the defendant's apartment unannounced, and ultimately found
the contraband leading to the defendant's arrest. The defendant moved to suppress the
evidence on the ground that the unannounced entry was illegal because it resulted from
information that was not immediately incident to the entry. The court held that in-
formation known to police officers before arriving at the scene could justify unan-
nounced entry to effect a search warrant.
9. Magistrate review was not an issue in the case. The Court did not expressly
indicate that these facts were known at the time the warrant was obtained, but the in-
formation supporting the search warrant and the unannounced entry were both ob-
tained from the same confidential informant. Id. at 876-77, 512 P.2d at 1211-12, 109
Cal. Rptr. at 307-08. It is a reasonable inference that all the information was obtained
at the same time. See People v. Kahre, 6 Cal. App. 3d 680, 86 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1970)
where the information supporting the warrant was clearly known to the officer at the
time the warrant was issued.
10. 104 Cal. Rptr. 643 (Cal. App. 1972), vacated, 9 Cal. 3d 934, 513 P.2d 611,
109 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1973). An informant entered the defendant's residence and made
controlled purchases of heroin for the police. The informant told the police that he
had seen a shotgun in the suspect's possession and the suspect was "known to" answer
the door armed. Based on this information, the officers obtained a search warrant
which included a provision that the officers "need not comply with Penal Code section
1531." Pursuant to the warrant, the officers entered the residence unannounced, found
narcotics, and arrested the defendants.
Defendants unsuccessfully moved to set aside the information on the grounds that
the evidence was inadmissable because there was no reasonable cause for the unan-
nounced entry. The superior court judge upheld the entry relying solely on the no-
knock warrant. The court of appeal affirmed and unanimously denied defendant's peti-
tion for a writ of prohibition. The supreme court, in a four to three decision, reversed
and issued the writ on the grounds that the magistrate had no authority to issue a "no-
knock" warrant, and that the superior court, in complete reliance on the warrant, had
failed to allow inquiry into the informant's credibility.
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by implying that magistrate review of facts tending to justify an un-
announced entry is unnecessary. This note will argue that such a re-
view is required by the Fourth Amendment whenever facts justifying
an unannounced entry are known when the search or arrest warrant is
obtained. The magistrate would determine whether or not unan-
nounced entry was justified by the facts before him. If the facts did
not change prior to the entry, the officer would be bound by the mag-
istrate's decision. If the facts did change, the officer would have the
burden of justifying his unannounced entry.1'
A secondary question presented by Parsley is to what degree an
informer's statements must be reliable in order to justify an officer's
or magistrate's decision that unannounced entry is warranted. The
three dissenting justices suggested that these statements need not be
as reliable to justify an unannounced entry as they -must be to justify
a search.12  This note concludes by urging that this position not be
adopted.
Background
California's knock-notice provision pertaining to warrants, Penal
Code section 1531, provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of
a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute
the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is re-
fused admittance.' 3
The purposes and policy underlying this knock-notice provision are:' 4
(1) the protection of the privacy of the individual in his home;
(2) the protection of innocent persons who may also be present
on the premises when an arrest is made;
(3) the prevention of situations which are conducive to violent
confrontations between the occupant and individuals who
enter his home without proper notice;
11. This viewpoint is to be distinguished from that of jurisdictions discussed
above where the magistrate's decision is final. See text accompanying notes 5-7, supra.
12. 9 Cal. 3d at 947-49, 513 P.2d at 619-21, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 571-73 (Clark,
McComb, & Burke, JJ., dissenting).
13. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1531 (West 1970). Penal Code section 844 is the equiva-
lent provision covering warrantless arrests: "To make an arrest, a private person, if
the offense be a felony, and in all cases a peace officer, may break open the door or
window of the house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which they have rea-
sonable grounds for believing him to be, after having demanded admittance and ex-
plained the purpose for which admittance is desired." Id. § 844. These sections are
"'identical in purpose' insofar as their announcement requirements are concerned."
Grevan v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 287, 292 n.6, 455 P.2d 432, 435 n.6, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 504, 507 n.6 (1969). Thus, much of the support for the textual material in this
note are cases involving section 844 since fewer cases have arisen under section 1531.
14. See generally Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L. 139, 152-
54 (1970).
(4) the protection of police who might be injured by a startled
and fearful householder.
15
Although these announcement provisions are absolute on their
face, several exceptions have been carved out by California courts.' 6
They have reasoned that since the statutes were a codification of the
common law,' 7 they should be subject to common law exceptions.' s
Therefore, noncompliance with section 1531 is excused when the of-
ficer has a reasonable and good faith belief' 9 that compliance would
allow a felon to escape,20 permit the destruction of evidence,2' place
the officer's safety in peril,22 or be a useless gesture since the officer's
identity and purpose are known.23
15. Duke v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 314, 321, 461 P.2d 628, 632-33, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 352-53 (1969) (citations omitted).
16. See Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitu-
tional Problem, 44 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 626, 630-33 (1970).
17. "In all cases when the King is a party, the sheriff (if the doors not be open)
may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do other execution of the K.'s
process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the
cause of his coming, and to make request to open doors ....... Semayne's Case, 77
Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603).
18. People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6, 9, cert. denied, 352 U.S.
858 (1956); see, e.g., Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822).
19. People v. Rosales, 68 Cal. 2d 299, 305, 437 P.2d 489, 493, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1,
5 (1968); accord, e.g., People v. De Santiago, 71 Cal. 2d 18, 28-29, 453 P.2d 353,
360, 76 Cal. Rptr. 809, 816 (1969); People v. Carrillo, 64 Cal. 2d 387, 391-92, 412
P.2d 377, 379, 50 Cal. Rptr. 185, 187 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1013 (1967).
Early California cases applied a subjective standard: "[W]hen there is reasonable
cause to make an arrest and search and the facts known to him before his entry are
not inconsistent with a good faith belief on the part of the officer that compliance with
section 844 is excused, his failure to comply with the formal requirements of that sec-
tion does not justify the exclusion of the evidence he obtains." People v. Maddox, 46
Cal. 2d 301, 306-07, 294 P.2d 6, 9-10, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956). Later Cali-
fornia cases shifted to the objective standard, possibly in response to the criticism of
the above language by four justices in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 63 (1963).
20. E.g., People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6, 9, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 858 (1956).
21. E.g., People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6, 9, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 858 (1956); People v. Colvin, 19 Cal. App. 3d 14, 22-23, 96 Cal. Rptr. 397,
402-03 (1971); People v. Kahre, 6 Cal. App. 3d 680, 683-84, 86 Cal. Rptr. 291, 292-
93 (1970); Guerrero v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 136, 139-41, 82 Cal. Rptr. 443,
444-46 (1969).
22. E.g., People v. Tribble, 4 Cal. 3d 826, 833, 484 P.2d 589, 593, 94 Cal. Rptr.
613, 617 (1971); People v. Bryant, 5 Cal. App. 3d 563, 568-69, 85 Cal. Rptr. 388,
392 (1970).
23. E.g., People v. Perales, 4 Cal. App. 3d 773, 779, 84 Cal. Rptr. 604, 608
(1970); People v. Limon, 255 Cal. App. 2d 519, 522, 63 Cal. Rptr. 91, 93 (1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 866 (1968). Compare Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301
(1958), where more than a reasonable and good faith belief was required to excuse
compliance with the federal knock-notice provision (18 U.S.C. § 3109): "It may be
that, without an express announcement of purpose, the facts known to officers would
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
September 1974] MAGISTRATE REVIEW OF ENTRY FACTS
Since 1967 these exceptions have been narrowly construed in
California:
Under the Fourth Amendment, a specific showing must always be
made to justify any kind of police action tending to disturb the
security of the people in their homes. Unannounced forcible entry
is in itself a serious disturbance of that security and cannot be justi-
fied on a blanket basis. Otherwise the constitutional test of rea-
sonableness would turn only on practical expediency, and the
amendment's primary safeguard-the requirement of particularity
-would be lost. 24
Thus, in California, the fact that the evidence sought in a search is
easily disposable, 25 or that the person involved is a member of a
class of persons more likely than others to destroy evidence, attempt
escape, or resist arrest,26 is not sufficient to justify unannounced entry.
The officer must have knowledge of specific facts which indicate that
this particular person will conduct himself in this manner when con-
fronted by police.27 For example, an informant's statement that a
person possesses heroin, which is easily disposable, would be sufficient
to justify unannounced entry under the blanket rule. In California,
the informer would have to indicate that the person possesses heroin
and then allege specific facts to show that the person will dispose
of it-for instance, that he has seen the person flush it down the toilet
when officers have knocked previously.
Other jurisdictions do permit unannounced entry on a 'blanket
basis," at least where the evidence sought is easily disposable. 28  Al-
justify them in being virtually certain that the petitioner already knows their purpose
so that an announcement would be a useless gesture." Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
24. People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d 586, 588-89, 432 P.2d 706, 708, 63 Cal. Rptr.
10, 12 (1967) (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 588, 432 P.2d at 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 12; accord, State v. Mendoza,
104 Ariz. 395, 399-400, 454 P.2d 140, 144-45 (1969); Reynolds v. State, 46 Ala. App.
77, 79-80, 238 So. 2d 557, 559-60 (Ala. Crim. App. 1970); Commonwealth v. New-
man, 429 Pa. 441, 448, 240 A.2d 795, 798 (1968); State v. Hatcher, 3 Wash. App.
441, 447-49, 475 P.2d 802, 805-07 (1970).
26. People v. Rosales, 68 Cal. 2d 299, 305, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5, 437 P.2d 489,
493 (1968) (parole violators).
27. This criterion was satisfied in People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779, 48 Cal. Rptr.
382, 409 P.2d 222 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 913 (1967), when the police were
in hot pursuit of an armed defendant, but not in People v. Rosales, 68 Cal. 2d 299,
66 Cal. Rptr. 1, 437 P.2d 489 (1968), when police entered a parole violator's home
unannounced.
28. E.g., People v. Hartfield, 94 Ill. App. 2d 421, 430-31, 237 N.E.2d 193, 197-
98 (1968); Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 523, 204 A.2d 516, 519 (1964); State v.
Johnson, 102 R.I. 344, 353-54, 230 A.2d 831, 836-37 (1967). Other jurisdictions fol-
low the "blanket rule" but also require a "no-knock" warrant. E.g., People v. Lujan,
174 Colo. 554, 559, 484 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1971); State v. Parker, 283 Minn. 127, 136,
166 N.W.2d 347, 353 (1969); People v. DeLago, 16 N.Y.2d 289, 292, 213 N.E. 659,
661, 266 N.Y.S.2d 353, 356 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1966). Oregon has
though this standard was held constitutional by the New York Court of
Appeals,2" the United States Supreme Court has yet to provide any
concrete guidance. The Court reviewed unannounced entry in Ker
v. California.30 Although eight of the nine justices believed the of-
ficers' method of entry was subject to the Fourth Amendment stan-
dards of reasonableness, no clear test was enunciated. State courts
have cited Ker in support of both the "blanket rule"'" and a standard
requiring specific facts.
3 2
Magistrate Authorization Versus Magistrate Review
Magistrate Authorization
In Parsley v. Superior Court,33 the state argued that a magistrate
could absolutely authorize an officer to enter unannounced, i.e. no
review of -the circumstances at the actual time of entry was necessary
in the trial court. This argument was based on an analogy to searches:
since the officers' method of entry is subject to Fourth Amendment
standards of reasonableness, a magistrate authorization via a "no-knock
warrant" is valid, just as is a search warrant. Conversely, the rule
modified the blanket rule somewhat: unannounced entry is proper only when (1) the
officers have probable cause to believe they are seeking a small, easily disposable
amount of evidence or an uncertain amount; and (2) reasonably believe that this evi-
dence will be disposed of it announcement is given. The second requirement would
preclude unannounced entry when it was impossible to dispose of the easily disposable
evidence, such as search of a college dormatory room which had no plumbing facilities.
State v. Gassner, 6 Ore. App. 452, 463-64, 488 P.2d 822, 827-28 (1971 ).
29. People v. DeLago, 16 N.Y.2d 289, 292, 213 N.E.2d 659, 661, 266 N.Y.S.2d
353, 356 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1966).
30. 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Officers having probable cause to arrest Ker entered
his apartment with a pass key. The unannounced entry was grounded on the officers'
belief that Ker possessed narcotics which could be easily destroyed and the fact that
Ker's "furtive" conduct shortly before the entry and arrest (he made a U-turn while
being followed by the officers) indicated he might be expecting the police. Eight of
the nine justices agreed that the method of entry was subject to the standards of the
Fourth Amendment. Although all eight recognized that the Fourth Amendment would
allow some exceptions to the announcement rule, they split four to four on whether
the entry was reasonable. Justice Clark, writing the prevailing opinion, believed the
facts noted above justified unannounced entry. Justice Brennan, writing for the four
dissenters, warned that "rigid restrictions upon unannounced entries are essential if the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against invasion of the security and privacy of the
home is to have any meaning." Id. at 53. He believed the entry was unconstitutional.
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, never reached the Fourth Amendment issues
because he believed state searches and seizures should be judged by the "fundamental
fairness" criteria of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause; applying this test,
he upheld the entry and consequently Ker's conviction. See generally Blakey, supra
note 1, at 536-51; No-Knock and the Constitution, supra note 2, at 882-86.
31. People v. Hartfield, 94 Ill. App. 421, 430-31, 237 N.E.2d 193, 197-98 (1968).
32. Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 448, 240 A.2d 795, 798-99 (1968).
33. 9 Cal. 3d 934, 513 P.2d 611, 109 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1973).
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that searches without a warrant are unreasonable per se should be
extended to the officer's method of entry. 4  This section attempts
both to provide background for the majority's rejection of this argu-
ment and to distinguish the arguments made in support of it by the
dissent.
The Parsley majority rejected this analogy between the search and
entry situations because "a search warrant must necessarily rest upon
previously obtained information, [while] unannounced entry is ex-
cused only on the basis of exigent circumstances existing at the time
an officer approaches a site to make an arrest or execute a warrant.
Facts existing at the time of obtaining a warrant may no longer exist
at the time of entry." 5  An implicit assumption underlying the court's
analysis is that it is reasonable to forego magistrate review and author-
ization in favor of an officer's last minute observations in the entry
situation but not in the search situation; i.e., the differing procedures
in each situation will minimize unnecessary intrusion into the citizen's
privacy.
Analytically, the difference can be justified only if the facts rele-
vant to the necessity of an unannounced entry are more likely to change
than those relevant to the success of a search. The probability of an
officer becoming aware of relevant factual changes arguably is greater
in -the entry situation. For example, it is difficult to imagine facts
occurring at the scene (short of finding the object of the search else-
where) which would tend to indicate that contraband was no longer
on the premises and, therefore, that a search was unreasonable. The
only way to determine if contraband is present is to search. On the
other hand, the possibility of officers observing facts conflicting with
the previous information related to the entry is arguably better. For
instance, justification for -an unannounced entry based on the presence
of a dangerous occupant on the premises would disappear if officers
observed -this person leave;36 prior justification for unannounced entry
based on probable destruction of evidence may be undone by officers
observing through a glass door that the occupant of the premises is
moving slowly toward the door to let them in.37  The Parsley ma-
34. Id. at 939, 513 P.2d at 614, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
35. Id. at 940, 513 P.2d at 614, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
36. This hypothetical is based on People v. Welch, 260 Cal. App. 2d 221, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 69 (1968), where unannounced entry was justified because the roommate of the
person to be arrested had been previously arrested for armed robbery and was consid-
ered dangerous.
37. Unannounced entry was upheld in People v. Steinberg, 148 Cal. App. 2d 855,
307 P.2d 634 (1957), because of observations of the defendant's conduct by officers
through a glass door. An informant had told the officers the defendant, an alleged
bookmaker, would attempt to destroy evidence. When the defendant saw the officers,
he got up from a desk with papers in hand and moved quickly away. What if the
defendant had moved toward the door?
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jority's refusal to sanction magistrate authorization of an unannounced
entry is sound.
At first glance, the Parsley majority and dissent appear to differ
on the comparative likelihood of changed circumstances in the entry
and search situations. The majority argues: "Facts existing at the
time of obtaining a warrant may no longer exist at the time of entry.
Such an emergency, therefore, can be judged only in light of circum-
stances of which the officer is aware at the latter moment."3 s  The
dissent counters: "[Pietitioner's habit of answering the door carry-
ing a loaded 12-gauge shotgun was a fact likely to persist longer than
the presence of any particular quantity of contraband on his prem-
ises."39  Each statement refers to a different type of fact. The ma-
jority is referring only to facts of which the officer is aware. The dis-
sent is referring to the true situation, i.e. all the facts and not just those
the officer is aware of. Although the dissent is probably correct in
saying the true situation is more likely to change in the search than in
the entry situation, this is irrelevant since only the officer's observa-
tions are pertinent. As noted above,40 the officer is more likely to be-
come aware of changed circumstances in the entry situation.
The Parsley dissent cites seven jurisdictions where "no-knock
warrants" are permissible. 4 Of these seven, however, the four that
have construed the destruction of the evidence exception permitted un-
announced entry under the "blanket rule,"42 i.e. on the ground that this
type of evidence is easily disposable. None of these jurisdictions has
construed the other exceptions to the announcement requirement.43
Under the "blanket rule" the pertinent aspects of the situation are not
likely to change; the officers are either looking for narcotics (dispos-
able) or grand pianos (non-disposable). However, the specific facts
38. 9 Cal. 3d at 940, 513 P.2d at 614, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 566 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 944, 513 P.2d at 618, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
40. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
41. 9 Cal. 3d at 946, 513 P.2d at 619, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
42. People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 559, 484 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1971), State v.
Parker, 283 Minn. 127, 136, 166 N.W.2d 347, 353 (1969); People v. DeLago, 16
N.Y.2d 289, 292, 213 N.E.2d 659, 661,- 266 N.Y.S.2d 353, 356 (1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 963 (1966) (construing N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 799 which now corresponds
to N.Y. Crim. Pro. Law § 690.35(3)(b) (McKinney 1971)); State v. Loucks, 209
N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1973) (construing N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-32(3) (1971) which
has almost identical language as N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-0 (1974)). See also 5
West's Fed. Forms § 7751A (1971) (derived from 21 U.S.C. § 879 (1972)). There
are no cases construing the District of Columbia (D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 23-591 (c)
(Supp. 1970)) or Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-411 (Supp. 1972)) statutes or the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 879 (1972)) on this point.
43. But compare 5 West's Fed. Forms § 7751B (1971) (derived from Controlled
Substances Act § 509, 21 U.S.C. § 879 (1972)) with People v. Welch, 260 Cal. App.
2d 221, 67 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1968) (comparison indicates specific facts are required in
both cases to enter unannounced).
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which California requires to justify unannounced entry44 can change.
Thus, those jurisdictions which permit unannounced entry based on the
"blanket rule" provide no support for "no-knock warrants" in Califor-
nia.
Magistrate Review: A Constitutional Requirement
Although the Parsley majority held that magistrate authorization
for unannounced entry is inappropriate and therefore clearly not a
constitutional requirement, the Parsley and Dumas decisions implicitly
suggest more. The decisions suggest that magistrate review of facts
tending to justify unannounced entry and known at the time the search
or arrest warrant is obtained is also constitutionally unnecessary. In
Parsley, there is certainly no approval of the appellate court's con-
clusion that magistrate review is "meritorious."45 Although magistrate
review was not an issue in Dumas, an unannounced entry was upheld
when a magistrate could have reviewed the facts justifying the entry
but did not do so.46 The issue should have been reviewed because
the precedents cited in support of the court's decision were all cases in
which the magistrate had no opportunity to review the facts relating
to entry.47
It is submitted that such magistrate review is required by the
Fourth Amendment and that the magistrate's decision is only an au-
thorization to enter unannounced if there is no change in circumstances
of which the officer could reasonably have become aware before the
entry.48 If such change in circumstances does occur, the officer must
justify any unannounced entry. This view of the law precludes com-
plete reliance on the magistrate's decision-the error committed in the
preliminary hearing in Parsley-and therefore would not change the
Parsley result.
An Analogy Between Search and Entry
The analogy between the search -and entry situations, properly
rejected by the Parsley majority with respect to magistrate authoriza-
tion,49 is valid for magistrate review. A magistrate cannot authorize
an unannounced entry absolutely but he must review the pertinent
facts; a favorable decision would provide authorization for unan-
44. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
45. See 104 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
46. See note 9 supra.
47. The precedents all involved warrantless arrest. See 9 Cal. 3d at 887-88, 512
P.2d at 1213, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
48. The appellate court in Parsley suggested this as a desirable procedure. See
104 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
49. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
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nounced entry contingent upon these facts not changing. This section
examines the general rules established by the Fourth Amendment for
other intrusions into a person's home: searches and securing the
premises while a search warrant is obtained. An analogy is then
drawn between these intrusions and unannounced entry.
The Fourth Amendment ° consists of two clauses. The first pro-
tects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. The second
provides that no warrants shall issue without probable cause. There
has been some controversy over whether a warrant is a condition pre-
cedent or is only one factor to be considered in determining whether a
search is reasonable. 51 It is generally accepted, however, that except
for a few limited situations the warrantless search of a person's home
is per se unreasonable:
52
Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has inter-
posed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was
done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for
illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might
weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the
law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust
to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and
the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows
that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted. And so
the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of
the police before they violate the privacy of the home. 53
In a few instances, society's interest in ensuring the safety of the
officer or third persons, or in preventing the destruction or loss of
evidence, outweighs the protection afforded the privacy of the indi-
vidual by magistrate review. In these situations, exigent circumstances
50. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; cf. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (West 1954).
51. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) (dictum).
52. Id. Compare People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr.
304 (1973), where the court suggests a heirarchy of Fourth Amendment protections
based upon different degrees of privacy thought to attach to different places. Homes
and offices were said to fall within the category of maximum protection-warrantless
searches are justified only in overwhelming emergencies. Secondary protection was af-
forded to automobiles, a suitcase left outside an apartment door, and a trashcan placed
by the curb for disposal of its contents. Tertiary protection was attributed to "open
fields" and other places where an expectation of privacy would be unreasonable. The
court emphasized that this hierarchy did not result from a differing constitutional
standard, but rather the application of the same standard of reasonableness to situations
where different degrees of privacy are expected. Id. at 882-83 & nn.8-10, 512 P.2d
at 311-12 & nn.8-10, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 1215-16 & nn.8-10.
53. MacDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
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make the obtaining of a warrant impracticable.54 However, these per-
missible warrantless intrusions into a person's home are limited to the
exigency at hand. For example, in Chimel v. California,55 searches
incident to arrest were limited to the person of the arrestee and the
area within which an arrestee could gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. A search in this area may be necessary to pre-
vent frustration of the arrest and to ensure the officer's safety, but
search of the defendant's entire three bedroom home, workshop, attic
and garage without a warrant was held unreasonable. However, prob-
able cause to believe there are additional suspects has been held a suf-
ficient exigency to justify search of the entire premises. 56
In Warden v. Hayden,5" police in hot pursuit of an armed robber
were justified in making a warrantless search of a house into which
the robber had fled. A search for weapons and accomplices was neces-
sary to ensure the officer's safety and therefore was reasonable within
the Fourth Amendment. 58  However, in Vale v. Louisiana,59 the court
held that officers could not conduct a warrantless search of the de-
54. Exigent circumstances or the impracticability of obtaining magistrate review
justifies a warrantless search in several situations. Automobile searches: Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443
(1971). Stop and frisk: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); cf. Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40 (1968). Search incident to arrest: United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973); cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Blood samples for alcohol
content: Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Emergency or impracticality
is not the only basis for exception to the warrant requirement. See Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (objects in plain view of an officer in a place he has a
right to be are subject .to seizure and are admissible into evidence); Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (indicates consent excuses the warrant requirement but
no consent found); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (warrant not required
to seize abandoned property).
55. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
56. People v. Block, 6 Cal. 3d 239, 245-46, 499 P.2d 961, 964-65, 103 Cal. Rptr.
281, 284-85 (1971). In Block the officers raided a marijuana party involving an unde-
termined number of participants. The court found the officers had probable cause to
search the upstairs for additional participants because the stairway and hall were il-
luminated. Id. The facts supporting the finding of probable cause were arguably
weak. See id. at 247-48, 499 P.2d at 965-66, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 285-86 (Peters, Tobriner,
JJ., dissenting). However, while the court may have "strained" to find an exigency
in Block, this does not affect the analogy between the unannounced entry and search
situations. There clearly is no exigency where the officer has knowledge of facts in-
dicating the announcement is excused when he obtains the search warrant. See text
accompanying notes 62-63 infra.
57. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
58. Id. at 298-99; cf. People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 735-741, 497 P.2d 1121,
1137-41, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 401-05 (1972) (warrantless search of defendant's home
upheld where officers concluded from defendant's assasination of Senator Kennedy that
there might be a conspiracy to assasinate other political leaders).
59. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
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fendant's home after observing him emerge from the home and sell
narcotics to a third party.
The same requirement of exigency is present when officers seek
to secure the premises while they wait for a warrant to be obtained.
In Shuey v. Superior Court,6" officers without a warrant went to the
defendant's apartment and requested permission to search for mari-
juana. When permission was refused, two officers remained to ensure
that any contraband was not destroyed while the third obtained a
warrant. The court held the subsequent search would be illegal if
the defendant could show on remand that the contraband would not
have been found but for the officer's occupation. The only exigency
was that created by the officers. On -the other hand, in Ferdin v.
Superior Court,6' securing the premises while obtaining a warrant was
upheld. The officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant be-
fore his premises were secured, and there was a danger that the de-
fendant would receive notice of the impending search and destroy evi-
dence while the officers were obtaining the warrant.6 2
Thus, a warrantless intrusion into a person's home to search or
to secure the premises is limited by the Fourth Amendment to situa-
tions where exigent circumstances are present. Since unannounced
entry is also subject to Fourth Amendment standards of reasonable-
ness, it should be governed by these same rules. When the facts just-
ifying unannounced entry first arise at the scene, magistrate review is
impossible. But when the facts are known to the officer at the time
the search or arrest warrant is obtained, as in Dumas, there is no
exigency; the neutral and detached magistrate has ample opportunity
to determine from this particular set of facts whether an unannounced
entry is proper or improper.
An Analysis of the Proposal
Requiring magistrate authorization to be contingent upon the
facts not changing before the time of entry incorporates into "no-
knock" warrants a contingency similar to that incorporated into search
warrants by the Fourth Amendment requirement of a particular de-
scription of the thing to be seized. For example, if officers possessing
a search warrant become aware that the items sought under the war-
rant are no longer on the premises but search anyway and find other
evidence, such evidence would be excluded because it was not particu-
60. 30 Cal. App. 3d 535, 106 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1973).
61. 36 Cal. App. 3d 774, 112 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1974); accord, People v. Freeny,
37 Cal. App. 3d 20, 112 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1974).
62. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 782, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 70-71.
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larly described in the warrant.63 Thus, changed circumstances would
render ineffective the magistrate's decision that a search was justified.
Reported cases on unannounced entry in California indicate that
magistrate review will not be a useless gesture; rather, the magistrate's
decision to allow unannounced entry will stand in almost all cases.
In no reported case have the officer's observations at the scene con-
flicted with -the prior information indicating the unannounced entry
was proper. This pattern suggests that the change of circumstances
necessary to invalidate the magistrate's decision will not occur very
often. On the other hand, -the magistrate's decision would stand in
many cases. Officers frequently have knowledge of facts sufficient
to permit unannounced entry before arriving at the scene. 64 Where
new facts have arisen at the scene, they have corroborated rather than
conflicted with the prior knowledge.65 A comparison of -the cases in-
dicates that the corroborating information was not always necessary
to justify the unannounced entry. 
6
63. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-473 (dictum), 514-19
(White & Warren, JJ., concurring and dissenting) (1971). Even if the evidence found
were in "plain view" it would probably still be excluded because its discovery could
not be considered "inadvertent" since the officers would be conducting an exploratory
search. See id. at 464-73.
64. Since this analysis deals with the frequency with which additional facts aris-
ing at the scene modify prior knowledge and not the frequency with which officers
have prior knowledge, sections 844 and 1531 are considered together. See note 13 su-
pra. Section 1531: See People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 304 (1973); People v. Kahre, 6 Cal. App. 3d 680, 86 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1970).
Section 844: See People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382
(1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 913 (1967); People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d
365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965), vacated, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); People v. Carter, 26
Cal. App. 3d 862, 103 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1972); People v. Bryant, 5 Cal. App. 3d 563,
85 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1970); Guerrero v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 136, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 443 (1969); People v. Taylor, 267 Cal. App. 2d 505, 73 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1968);
People v. Welch, 260 Cal. App. 2d 221, 67 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1968); People v. Griffin,
250 Cal. App. 2d 545, 58 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1967).
65. Section 1531: See People v. Vasquez, 1 Cal. App. 3d 769, 82 Cal. Rptr. 131
(1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970). Section 844: See People v. Tribble, 4 Cal.
3d 826, 484 P.2d 589, 94 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1971); People v. Colvin, 19 Cal. App. 3d
14, 96 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1971); People v. Gonzales, 14 Cal. App. 3d 881, 92 Cal. Rptr.
660, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1002 (1971); People v. Stewart, 11 Cal. App. 3d 242, 89
Cal. Rptr. 707 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971) (overruled on other grounds
in People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 451, 492 P.2d 1, 7, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 319 (1972));
People v. Meyers, 8 Cal. App. 3d 268, 87 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1970); People v. Newell,
272 Cal. App. 2d 638, 77 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1969); People v. Robinson, 269 Cal. App.
2d 789, 75 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1969); People v. Morales, 259 Cal. App. 2d 290, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 234, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 988 (1968); People v. Steinberg, 148 Cal. App. 2d
855, 307 P.2d 634 (1957).
66. For instance, in People v. Steinberg, 148 Cal. App. 2d 855, 307 P.2d 634
(1957), a reliable informant told police that the defendant would attempt to flush evi-
dence of bookmaking activity down the toilet if confronted by police. When the police
The burden of proof on the issue of whether "changed circum-
stances" did exist when the officers arrived at the scene can be allocated
in such a way that the defendant is not disadvantaged by the prior
magistrate review. A useful model is provided in Theodor v. Superior
Court,6 7 where a defendant was allowed to attack the factual veracity
of an affidavit supporting a search warrant. The defendant had the
initial burden of demonstrating that the supporting affidavit contained
inaccuracies; this is consistent with the general rule that the defendant
carries the burden of quashing a warrant. 68  If the defendant is able
to prove factual inaccuracies in the supporting affidavit, the effect is
the elimation of the warrant. Then, consistent with the prosecution's
burden in any warrantless search or arrest, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to show that the inaccuracies were the result of reasonable
mistakes.69
A similar procedure is appropriate when a magistrate has reviewed
the facts relating to entry and decided that these facts justified unan-
nounced entry. The officer would first allege that he was aware of no
additional facts at -the scene which would tend to indicate that unan-
nounced entry was improper. This allegation, plus the magistrate's
prior decision, would establish the prosecution's prima facie case that
the entry was proper. The defendant would then have to come for-
ward with -additional facts which arose after the magistrate review.
Following such a showing, the prosecution would have to show that the
officer could not reasonably have been aware of these facts or that the
unannounced entry was justified even when considering them.
A magistrate's conditional authorization imposes no hardship on
the defendant. First, by making the -authorization conditional, the of-
ficer's last minute observations are not sacrificed. Second, under the
suggested allocation of the burden of proof, the affidavit supporting
the conditional authorization merely takes the place of the allegations
the prosecution would initially have to make. Since the veracity of
this -affidavit can be attacked, 70 the defendant is in the same position
he would have been in if it did not exist. Third, officers possessing
the conditional authorization in the search or arrest warrant situations
arrived, they identified themselves but failed to demand entrance or announce their pur-
pose. Through a glass door, they saw the defendant get up from a desk with papers
in hand and move rapidly away. Their failure to comply with section 844 was excused.
But in Guerrero v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 136, 82 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1969),
compliance with section 844 was excused solely on the basis of an informant's state-
ments that the defendant was watching for the police with an intent to destroy evi-
dence.
67. 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972).
68. Id. at 101-02, 501 P.2d at 251-52, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 243-44.
69. Id.
70. See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
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are just as likely to make a good faith effort to observe corroborating
or conflicting facts at the scene of the entry. It is in the officer's best
interest to ensure that the unannounced entry is necessary, because
such entry involves a substantial risk to the officer's safety. 71 On the
other hand, both the police and the citizen benefit from -the additional
review of the situation by the neutral ,and detached magistrate: such
review will help to ensure that the citizen's privacy will not be subjected
to unnecessary intrusions and also that the risk of violent confronta-
tions between surprised citizens and the police is incurred only where
necessary.
72
Reliability of Information Supporting Unannounced Entry
In reviewing the lawfulness of an officer's unannounced entry
predicated on an informant's statements, California courts have utilized
the probable cause standards applicable to search warrants. 71 In
Parsley, however, three dissenting justices74 indicated that the search
warrant probable cause standards are too stringent for unannounced
entry. They would apply the looser standards utilized in "stop and
frisk" situations; that is, the informant's statements need be supported
only by sufficient "indicia of reliability" to justify an unannounced
entry.
7 5
71. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra &notes 80-82 infra.
72. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
73. Compare Guerrero v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 136, 140, 82 Cal. Rptr.
443, 445 (1969) with People v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 704, 711, 493 P.2d 1183,
1188, 100 Cal. Rptr. 319, 324 (1972); accord, State v. Daniels, 294 Minn. 323, 200
N.W.2d 403 (1972). A search warrant based on an informant's hearsay statements
is proper only when the magistrate is aware of (1) facts underlying the informant's
incriminating conclusions-Le. the informant must allege personal knowledge, provide
sufficient facts to allow an inference of personal knowledge, or explain why his sources
were reliable, and (2) facts indicating the informant was credible or his information
reliable. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964); accord, People v. Scoma, 71
Cal. 2d 332, 336, 455 P.2d 419, 422, 78 Cal. Rptr. 491, 494 (1969). Even if the facts
underlying he informant's conclusions are not known, the hearsay information can lead
to a finding of probable cause when corroborated by other facts which indicate reliance
on the information is reasonable. People v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d at 711-12,
493 P.2d at 1188, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 324; See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,
415-16 (1969).
74. Justices Clark, McComb, and Burke.
75. 9 Cal. 3d at 947-48, 513 P.2d at 620, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 572. The "indicia
of reliability" test was first announced in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
In Adams, an informant told an officer that the respondent was armed and carrying
narcotics. Based on this information, the officer approached the respondent's car and
asked him to open the door. When the respondent rolled down the window, the officer
reached into the respondent's waistband and withdrew a revolver. An arrest followed.
Id. at 144-46. The Court acknowledged that "this unverified tip may have been insuffi-
cient for an] . . . arrest or search warrant." Id. at 147. But the stop & frisk was
upheld because the informant's tip was supported by sufficient "indicia of reliability":
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
There are several significant differences between the unan-
nounced entry and stop and frisk situations which make the extension
to unannounced entry of the lesser standard of "indicia of reliability"
unreasonable. First, the frisk is a very limited intrusion into an in-
dividual's personal security, such as a quick pat down of outer cloth-
ing76 or removal of a revolver from the suspect's waistband. 7 On the
other hand, because unannounced entry may involve the breaking
down of one's door followed by the entry of several strangers"8 into
the home, it surely constitutes a much more offensive, frightening,
and potentially embarrassing invasion of privacy.
79
Second, when the information leading to the frisk is incorrect-
the person is not armed and presently dangerous-there is minimal
danger of a violent confrontation. Since the person is aware that he
is dealing with the police and that there are consequences for resisting,
he is likely to cooperate. An unannounced police entry, however, al-
ways creates a danger of violent confrontation because the frightened
occupants may mistake the police for someone who has no right to
be there8" or who threatens physical violence. In State v. Williams,"'
an officer making an unannounced entry was shot. The defendant
was having illicit relations with another man's wife and allegedly be-
lieved that the intruder was the woman's husband who had threatened




Third, in stop and frisk situations the opportunity to corroborate
the informant's tip is almost impossible because the stop necessarily
follows the tip immediately. However, in the unannounced entry situ-
(1) The informant was known to the officer personally and had given him informa-
tion previously; (2) the informant came forward personally to offer information that
was immediately verifiable at the scene; and (3) the informant might have been crimi-
nally liable for giving false information. Id. at 146-47. The informant's statements
clearly would not have supported a search warrant. See note 73 supra. They were
stated in conclusory terms and included no indication of personal knowledge or infor-
mation supporting his sources' reliability. Also, his credibility was questionable. He
had given information in the past concerning homosexual conduct, not guns and nar-
cotics, which had failed to lead to an arrest because it was uncorroborated on investi-
gation. Respondent's innocuous conduct when approached by the officer provided no
corroboration for the tip; he rolled down his car window when asked to open his door.
Id. at 155-57. See generally Comment, The Informant's Tip and Terry's "Reasonable
Conclusion"-A Modified Standard, 4 TExAs TECH L. REV. 167 (1972).
76. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
77. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
78. Many times the officers are not in uniform. See, e.g., MacDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 457 (1948).
79. In People v. Bryant, 5 Cal. App. 3d 563, 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. 388, 392 (1970),
the intruders found a man and woman in bed.
80. MacDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460-61 (1948).
81. 49 Utah 320, 163 P. 1104 (1917).
82. Id. at 329-31, 163 P, at 1107-08 (concurring opinion).
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ation, the officers may have several days in which to corroborate a tip.
Eliminating the necessity for corroboration by applying the "indicia of
reliability" test would preclude further investigation which might prove
the tip inaccurate and the unannounced entry unnecessary.
Thus, courts are urged to maintain strict criteria for justification
of unannounced entry. Such criteria both encourage continued invest-
igations of an informant's reliability and-ensure maximum protection
of the officer's safety and the individual's privacy.
Conclusion
Although the result in the Parsley case was desirable, it is hoped
that the court will hold that magistrate review of facts tending to justify
unannounced entry is a constitutional requirement when these facts
are known to the affiant at the time a search or arrest warrant is ob-
tained. If these facts create a reasonable and good faith belief that
unannounced entry is proper, the magistrate should include in the
search warrant authorization for an unannounced entry which is con-
tingent upon no conflicting facts arising before the entry. This pro-
cedure inserts a neutral and detached magistrate between the citizen
and the police while maintaining the advantage of the consideration of
the officer's last minute observations. The defendant is at no dis-
advantage compared to present practice because he can still attack the
veracity of the affidavit supporting the warrant or demonstrate that
the authorization to enter unannounced was void because additional
facts arose at the scene. Having done so, the burden shifts to the
prosecution to prove that the entry was appropriate.
Furthermore, the standard of trustworthiness used to determine
if an informant's statements provide reasonable cause to enter unan-
nounced should not be reduced to the level of "stop and frisk." To
do so would be "unreasonable" within the meaning of -the Fourth
Amendment, because unannounced entry is a more severe intrusion
into privacy and involves a greater danger to the officer and the citizen
than does stop and frisk. A lesser standard would erode the benefit
afforded by magistrate review to the security of the citizen in his home.
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